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The Sovereign Charter: Security, Territory 
and the Boundaries of Constitutional Rights 
IRINA CERIC*
“The Sovereign Charter” takes as its starting point the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Charkaoui v 
Canada, which struck down some portions of the 
security certifi cate process of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act as contrary to s. 7 of the Charter. 
Although this decision was hailed as a victory, I argue 
that Charkaoui redraws long-standing divisions along 
long-standing lines of alleged risk, allegiance and ori-
gin. I then explore the emergence of tentative shifts 
in jurisprudential conceptions of state sovereignty 
and extra-territoriality through a consideration of 
four post-Charkaoui decisions: the two judgments in 
the Omar Khadr matter, the Amnesty International 
claim regarding Afghan POWs detained by the Cana-
dian military and a case with respect to an over-
seas RCMP investigation. The article then develops 
three arguments about the dialectical process by which 
changing notions of sovereignty both determine and 
are refl ected in the territorial reach of the Charter, and 
theorize this process as one in which rights continue 
to constrain ways of challenging disciplinary power at 
the same time as they minimally limit its reach. These 
three meditations consider rights and sovereignty as 
a juri dical “act”, through the lens of international law 
and in the context of biopolitics.
Le concept de « Charte souveraine » tire son origine 
de la décision rendue par la Cour suprême du Canada 
dans Charkaoui c Canada, qui a invalidé certaines parties 
du processus du certifi cat de sécurité prévu à la Loi 
sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés au motif 
qu’elles contrevenaient à l’article 7 de la Charte. Bien 
que cette décision ait été saluée comme une victoire, 
je soutiens que l’arrêt Charkaoui ranime de vieilles 
controverses de même que des visions anciennes 
des concepts de risques présumés, d’allégeance et 
d’origine. J’explore ensuite l’émergence de tenta-
 tives de renversements dans les conceptions juris-
pruden tielles de la souveraineté de l’État et de 
l’extraterritorialité dans quatre décisions rendues 
dans la foulée de l’arrêt Charkaoui : soit les deux 
jugements prononcés dans l’affaire Omar Khadr, la 
poursuite intentée par Amnistie internationale rela-
tive aux prisonniers de guerre afghans détenus par 
l’armée canadienne et une cause portant sur une 
enquête menée à l’étranger par la GRC. L’article 
élabore par la suite trois arguments au sujet du pro-
cessus dialectique en vertu duquel des notions nova-
trices de souveraineté déterminent la portée terri-
toriale de la Charte, et défi nit ce processus comme 
permettant aux droits de continuer à restreindre les 
manières de contester les pouvoirs disciplinaires 
tout en limitant de façon minimale leur portée. Ces 
trois formes de réfl exion examinent les droits et 
la souveraineté en tant qu’« actes juridiques » selon la 
perspective du droit international et dans le contexte 
des biopolitiques.
* Irina Ceric, JD, LLM, of the Bars of Ontario and New York. This article arises from a master’s thesis 
written under the supervision of Prof. Shin Imai at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. 
It was substantially revised while I was a Visiting Researcher at Harvard Law School’s Institute for 
Global Law and Policy. I thank Prof. Imai for his guidance and mentorship; all errors and omissions 
are my own.
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The Sovereign Charter: Security, Territory 
and the Boundaries of Constitutional Rights 
IRINA CERIC*
I. INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudential borders of the Canadian state appeared to shift in the aftermath 
of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada (Supreme Court or 
the Court) on the constitutionality of the security certifi cate provisions of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.1 By granting limited constitutional rights to 
non-citizens implicated in national security proceedings, the decision in Charkaoui 
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),2 striking down portions of the IRPA’s security 
certifi cate procedure, was a signal departure from previous caselaw upholding the 
use of secret evidence and indefi nite detention. Charkaoui ultimately maintained 
the contingency of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 re-drawing long-
standing divisions along lines of alleged risk, allegiance and origin, despite the 
emergence of tentative shifts in jurisprudential conceptions of state sovereignty and 
extra-territoriality. Where previous national security cases involving constitutional 
rights claims by non-citizens were predicated on a conceptualization of state 
sovereignty as the right to exclude from territory (e.g. the oft-quoted maxim that 
“[t]he most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do not 
have an unqualifi ed right to enter or remain in the country”4), reading Charkaoui 
in the context of four subsequent cases involving the role of Canadian state actors 
abroad5 gives rise to the prospect of the Charter operating to delineate and maintain 
1 SC 2001, c 27 s 77(1) ff [IRPA].
2 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350 [Charkaoui].
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
4 Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 SCR 711 at 733, 90 DLR (4th) 289 
[Chiarelli cited to SCR].
5 These four cases involve the application of the Charter to the actions of the Canadian military in 
Afghanistan (Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Chief of Defence Staff), 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 
4 FCR 149 [Amnesty International Canada]); the RCMP’s participation in an extra-territorial investi-
gation (R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 SCR 292 [Hape]); and two claims brought by a Canadian 
citizen imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay (Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125 
[Khadr 2008]; Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr 2010]).
356 REVUE DE DROIT D’OTTAWA OTTAWA LAW REVIEW
44:2 44:2
the limits of state sovereignty within and beyond national borders. While the Charter 
may accompany the extended reach of the Canadian state in some of its guises, it 
provides only a minimal constraint on the actions of its agents, reinscribing rather 
than challenging sovereignty. Accordingly, this article argues that the “sovereign 
Charter” represents a key moment in the evolution of the Canadian state’s national 
security, immigration and foreign policy strategies, serving to harden the boundaries 
of the nation from within and without. By theorizing the doctrinal rules related to 
the extra-territorial application of the Charter, this article concludes that rights, as 
refl ected in Charkaoui and subsequent caselaw, continue to offer only a limited mode 
of resistance against sovereign power.
I take as a starting point Kunal Parker’s contention that the emancipatory 
potential of rights cannot be divorced from the seemingly contradictory process 
in which “the unmitigated ‘defence’ of territory against the incursion of aliens goes 
along with—indeed, cannot be separated from—the unmitigated commitment 
to protecting the fundamental constitutional rights of aliens as persons on the 
territorial ‘inside.’”6 Parker further argues that “[l]eft-liberal discourses of the 
nation … are thus fully aware that the universality of nation and law as they imagine 
them—in other words, of nation as law or law as nation—can only be realized in 
and by building walls around [that] space …”, such that rights become constitutive 
of a national sense of self.7 It is within this context, I argue, that the framework of 
the sovereign Charter emerged, particularly in relation to cases involving the rights 
of non-citizens and “national security.” Beyond both immigration law’s historical 
preoccupation with race and the contemporary focus on the “war on terror,” the 
very notion of rights functions as a discursive and aspirational marker of sovereignty. 
The focus of the remainder of this article is the trajectory of this jurisprudential 
process as courts perpetuate and shift the content and strength of rights guarantees.
I begin with a brief historical overview of the key Charter decisions on 
citizenship, national security and the Charter prior to Charkaoui (especially the 
previous unsuccessful constitutional challenges to the security certifi cate process), 
and then outline the Charkaoui decision. In the second part of this article, I discuss 
four post-Charkaoui decisions that engage the Charter and questions of territory, 
security and sovereignty. Finally, I develop three arguments about the dialectical 
process by which changing notions of sovereignty both determine and are refl ected 
in the territorial reach of the Charter. I theorize this process as one in which rights 
continue to constrain ways of challenging disciplinary power—understood as the 
operation of broadly dispersed systems of control, regulation and management8—
at the same time as they minimally limit its reach.
6 Kunal Parker, “Ejecting an Inside: An Essay on the Politics of the Contemporary American Immi-
gration State” in Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt, eds, Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject 
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004) 181 at 182-83. 
7 Ibid at 183 [emphasis in the original].
8 See Part IV, below, for more on this topic.
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A preliminary question regarding my engagement with the concept of 
“sovereignty” remains: although the caselaw, as shown below, is replete with 
references to and justifi cations for sovereignty, it is almost entirely bereft of 
defi nitions, relying on a common-sense understanding of the term.9 Recent 
scholarly literature on law and sovereignty, on the other hand, takes as its starting 
point Carl Schmitt’s now apocryphal statement that “[s]overeign is he who decides 
on the exception.”10  This concept of the “exception” took on increased (but hardly 
new11) juridical salience after the events of September 11, 2001, particularly with 
respect to questions of (anti-)terrorism, states of emergency and constitutional 
politics.12 However, as Jeremy Webber explains, for Schmitt, “the emergency tends 
to swallow up normality,”13 and his conceptualization of sovereignty and the role 
of “the decision” was intended as a “general concept in the theory of the state, and 
not merely … a construct applied to any emergency decree or state of siege.”14 
In his later work, Schmitt thus outlined a conception of the nomos, a “constituting 
power that bestows upon the laws their sovereign legitimacy,” the outcome of 
the historical event by which law becomes legal.15  While I briefl y engage with 
Schmitt’s theoretical framework in part IV of this article, I am concerned far less 
9 Perhaps the most considered discussion is found in Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 SCR 911 
[Mitchell] at para 129: “Merged sovereignty’ asserts that First Nations were not wholly subordinated 
to non-aboriginal sovereignty but over time became merger partners. The fi nal Report of the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 2 (Restructuring the Relationship (1996)), at 214, says that ‘Aboriginal 
governments give the constitution [of Canada] its deepest and most resilient roots in the Canadian 
soil.’ This updated concept of Crown sovereignty is of importance. Whereas historically the Crown 
may have been portrayed as an entity across the seas with which aboriginal people could scarcely be 
expected to identify, this was no longer the case in 1982 when the s. 35(1) reconciliation process was 
established.  The Constitution was patriated and all aspects of our sovereignty became fi rmly located 
within our borders. If the principle of ‘merged sovereignty’ articulated by the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples is to have any true meaning, it must include at least the idea that aboriginal and 
non-aboriginal Canadians together form a sovereign entity with a measure of common purpose and 
united effort. It is this new entity, as inheritor of the historical attributes of sovereignty, with which 
existing aboriginal and treaty rights must be reconciled” [emphasis in original]. See also Part IV, 
below, for more on this topic.
10 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George Schwab 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) at 5 [footnotes omitted]. Although Schmitt’s legacy 
as a legal and political theorist has been inextricably coloured by his membership in the Nazi Party 
and role as a legal advocate for the Reich government during the last days of the Weimar Republic, 
his work on sovereignty, legitimacy and the bases of state and popular power remain infl uential 
and highly cited. See especially Susan Buck-Morss, “Sovereign Right and the Global Left” (2007) 19:4 
Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society 432 at 438.
11 See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: 
A TWAIL Perspective” (2005) 43:1 & 2 Osgoode Hall LJ 171.
12 See e.g. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2005). See Part IV(iii), below, for more on this topic.
13 Jeremy Webber, “National Sovereignty, Migration, and the Tenuous Hold of International Legality: 
The Resurfacing (and Resubmersion?) of Carl Schmitt” in Oliver Schmidtke & Saime Ozcurumez, eds, 
Of States, Rights, and Social Closure: Governing Migration and Citizenship (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008) 61 at 66.
14 Webber, supra note 10 at 5.
15 Buck-Morss, supra note 10 at 438. 
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with questions about the exception in constitutional politics than with the notion of 
sovereignty as constructed by and through law. Rather than rely on a juridical ideal 
in which sovereignty is usually understood as exclusive authority over territory 
(with the corollary being that said territory be coterminous with that authority), 
Saskia Sassen argues that “it is becoming evident that state sovereignty articulates 
both its own and external conditions and norms.”16 She concludes that “[t]he politics 
of contemporary sovereignties are far more complex than notions of mutually 
exclusive territorialities can capture” and “[t]he question of territory as a parameter 
for authority and rights has entered a new phase.”17  This article aims to articulate 
the scope of that parameter, theorizing the processes by which sovereignty is used, 
(re)made and abused by, and through, Charter jurisprudence. 
II. CHARKAOUI AND ITS PREDECESSORS
A. Charter Jurisprudence Pre-Charkaoui
The Supreme Court’s decision in Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration,18 
three years after the inception of the Charter, set the trajectory of immigration and 
refugee constitutional rights cases on something of an arc—an initial embrace of 
inclusivity and limitations to sovereign prerogative, followed by a slow retreat toward 
a lukewarm reception of international norms as the basis for narrow constitutional 
protection. The Singh case was brought by seven refugee claimants denied refugee 
status under the United Nations’ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees19 without 
the benefi t of an oral hearing. The Supreme Court’s judgment granting rights under 
section 7 of the Charter to “every human being who is physically present in Canada 
and by virtue of such presence [is] amenable to Canadian law”20 appeared to provide a 
foundation for future migration-related rights claims. Four years later, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia established citizenship as 
an analogous ground of discrimination under section 15 of the Charter.21 Considered 
in tandem, Singh and Andrews suggest that constitutional rights claims for migrants 
and non-citizens emerged with a presumption of inclusion, a tentative reconciliation 
of national sovereignty, territory and the policy demands of migration.
In the context of these and other fl edgling Charter cases, the fi rst Charter 
challenge to the national security provisions of the 1976 Immigration Act22 was 
16 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006) at 415. 
17 Ibid at 415-16.
18 [1985] 1 SCR 177, 17 DLR (4th) 422, Wilson J [Singh cited to SCR].
19 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954) [Convention].
20 Singh, supra note 18 at 202. The minority decision, written by Justice Beetz, determined that refugee 
claimants are entitled to a fair hearing pursuant to the Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44, reprinted 
in RSC 1985, App III, s 2(e) (Singh, supra note 18 at 223). 
21 [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].
22 Immigration Act, SC 1976-77, c 52.
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launched.23 Although the security certifi cate process has evolved considerably over 
time, the general framework has remained the same: immigration law allows the 
federal government to issue a certifi cate with respect to the inadmissibility to Canada 
of a named non-citizen (including permanent residents) “on grounds of security.”24 
Under the version of the procedure challenged in Charkaoui, this “security certifi cate” 
was referred to a single judge of the Federal Court of Canada for determination of its 
“reasonableness,” a process that generally included in-camera hearings in the absence 
of the named individual and his or her counsel, the use of undisclosed evidence 
and information, relaxed evidentiary rules and, if the named person was not a 
permanent resident, mandatory detention during the entire lengthy proceeding. 
If the certifi cate was found to be “reasonable,” it lead to the automatic removal 
of the named person from Canada, and this reasonableness determination could 
not be appealed on its merits. Thus, the security certifi cate mechanism arguably 
imported national security concerns not related to migration into immigration law. 
Accordingly, constitutional challenges to this process showcase the boundaries of 
the Charter, the role of rights in excluding the partially or contingently included 
and the concomitant reinforcement of the juridical migration-security-territory 
nexus as a quintessential exercise of sovereignty. In policing the borders of the 
state from the inside, through the exercise of immigration rather than criminal law, 
security certifi cates underscore that exclusion is a sovereign prerogative, if not duty. 
Maintaining that policing power in the face of rights-based claims reveals much 
about the (re)construction and maintenance of national sovereignty. 
In Brito, the Federal Court of Appeal quickly disposed of Victor Brito’s 
claim under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter on retroactivity grounds (the original 
deportation order against him had been issued in early 1982, prior to the passage 
of the Charter), but not before setting out one of the key conceptual bases for the 
security-related Charter claims to follow. In the course of disallowing Brito’s claim 
under the Canadian Bill of Rights, and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Prata v Minister of Manpower & Immigration,25 Justice Marceau reiterated that 
“[a]t common law no alien has any right to enter this country except by leave of the 
Crown; and the Crown can refuse leave without giving any reason,” and therefore, 
non-removal from Canada is a privilege rather than a right deserving of legal 
23 Brito v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] 1 FCR 80, 70 NR 102 (FCA) [Brito cited 
to FCR].
24 IRPA, supra note 1, s 77(1). Beginning with the Immigration Act (supra note 22, ss 39-42), which fi rst 
initiated the division of non-citizens subject to removal on security grounds into two categories—
permanent residents and persons “other than a Canadian citizen”—various versions of the security 
certifi cate procedure were enacted. The most important variation involved the changing role of the 
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which for a time heard security certifi cate reports 
at oral hearings for permanent residents and was briefl y given responsibility for hearing such reports 
submitted in respect of all other non-citizens. See generally Ian Leigh, “Secret Proceedings in Canada” 
(1996) 34:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 113.
25 Prata v Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1976] 1 SCR 376 at 380, 3 NR 484 [Prata].
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protection.26  While the Court in Brito did not explicitly import this basis for its 
Bill of Rights decision into its Charter analysis, and Justice MacGuigan suggested in 
his concurring reasons that the right/privilege distinction was no longer signifi cant 
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Singh, the underlying common law 
alien/citizen dichotomy would seamlessly transfer to subsequent Charter challenges 
to deportation or removal on security grounds, as outlined below. 
Chiarelli was the Supreme Court’s next major immigration law decision after 
Singh. Joseph (Giuseppe) Chiarelli had arrived in Canada from Italy as a 15 year-old 
landed immigrant in 1975. Almost 20 years later, having never become a Canadian 
citizen, he was named in a security certifi cate alleging that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that he would engage in a pattern of organized criminal 
activity, including extortion and drug-related activities. Chiarelli challenged the 
constitutionality of the security certifi cate procedure, arguing that the process 
infringed his rights under sections 7, 12 and 15 of the Charter. Writing for a 
unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Sopinka concluded that as there was no breach 
of fundamental justice, it was not necessary to address the question of whether 
Chiarelli had been deprived of his right to life, liberty or security of the person: 
[I]n determining the scope of principles of fundamental justice as 
they apply to this case, the Court must look at the principles and 
policies underlying immigration law. The most fundamental principle 
of immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualifi ed right to 
enter or remain in the country.27
As the security certifi cate procedure continued to evolve after Chiarelli, 
challenges to its constitutionality continued apace. One of the standout decisions 
was Al Yamani v Canada (Solicitor General), in which the Federal Court held that one 
of the grounds of inadmissibility set out in the Immigration Act was contrary to the 
Charter’s guarantee of freedom of association. A Palestinian born in Lebanon, Issam Al 
Yamani, was considered stateless upon his arrival in Canada as a landed immigrant 
in 1985. In 1992, he was named in a security certifi cate alleging inadmissibility 
because there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was a member of “an 
organization that is likely to engage” in proscribed acts of violence, on the basis 
of his association with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.28 Federal 
Court Justice MacKay found that this test for inadmissibility restricts freedom of 
association because “[i]t is the association of persons as members of the organizations 
described that leads to their classifi cation for exclusion or deportation” rather than 
“their individual records of participating in violent activities [or] a determination 
26 Brito, supra note 23 at 94.
27 Ibid at 733 [emphasis added].
28 Al  Yamani v Canada (Solicitor General), [1996] 1 FCR 174 at 221, 129 DLR (4th) 226 (FCTD) [Al  Yamani 
cited to FCR].
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that they are likely to participate in such activities.”29 In deciding that the breach 
was not saved by section 1 of the Charter, Justice MacKay held:
I am not satisfi ed … that there is a rational connection between 
protecting the lives and safety of persons in Canada and restricting 
freedom of association of permanent residents who are merely 
members of organizations, whatever their nature, that are likely 
(susceptible) to commit acts of violence that would or might endanger 
lives or safety of persons in Canada.”30
It is precisely this sort of nuanced contextualization, however, that was 
lacking in the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Ahani and Suresh cases decided a few 
months after the events of September 11, 2001.31 Manickavasagam Suresh had been 
found to be a Convention refugee but had not yet been granted landed immigrant 
status when he was named in a security certifi cate stating that he was a member 
of an organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which was engaged in 
“terrorist” activity. The certifi cate was upheld as reasonable by the Federal Court 
in 1997 and Suresh was ordered deported following a hearing and the issuance 
of a “danger opinion” by the Immigration Minister.32 He sought judicial review 
of these decisions, arguing that his removal to Sri Lanka, where he was at risk 
of torture, violated his rights under section 7 of the Charter. The Supreme Court 
eventually determined that Suresh had made out a prima facie case of the possibility 
of torture if he were returned to Sri Lanka, and he had not been provided with 
suffi cient procedural safeguards necessary to protect his section 7 interests:
[G]enerally to deport a refugee, where there are grounds to believe 
that this would subject the refugee to a substantial risk of torture, 
would unconstitutionally violate the Charter’s s. 7 guarantee of life, 
liberty and security of the person. This said, we leave open the 
possibility that in an exceptional case such deportation might 
be justifi ed either in the balancing approach under ss. 7 or 1 of 
the Charter.33
Although Suresh was allowed to remain in Canada, the Supreme Court’s 
rather equivocal decision on the issue of torture did not have the same result in 
the companion Ahani decision. Mansour Ahani made a successful claim for refugee 
29 Ibid at 222-23.
30 Ibid at 228 [emphasis in original].
31 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3 [Suresh]; Ahani v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 2, [2002] 1 SCR 72 [Ahani SCC]
32 Suresh, supra note 31 at paras 11-14.
33 Ibid at para 129 [emphasis added].
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status upon his arrival in Canada from Iran in 1991, but prior to becoming a landed 
immigrant a security certifi cate was issued, alleging that he was inadmissible to 
Canada on the basis of involvement in “terrorism” because of his association with 
the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security. While the designated judge’s 
decision as to the reasonableness of the certifi cate was pending, Ahani brought an 
action alleging that the security certifi cate procedure for non-permanent residents 
violated his rights under sections 7, 9 and 10(c) of the Charter.34 Justice McGillis of 
the Federal Court proceeded with a section 7 analysis premised on the principle that 
the rights accorded to the him as a Convention refugee were limited rights, including 
a qualifi ed right to enter, to be landed and to not be removed unless he is a member 
of an inadmissible class and is found to be a danger to the security of Canada.35 
Justice McGillis concluded that the security certifi cate procedure did not violate 
the principles of fundamental justice, noting that its constitutional validity “must 
be analysed in the context of ‘the principles and policies underlying immigration 
law’” and that the case was “purely and simply an immigration matter.”36 As a result, 
the procedural due process rights asserted by Ahani were dismissed, as criminal 
law standards of fundamental justice do not apply in the context of immigration 
principles and policies.37 Following the defeat of this constitutional motion and 
denial of subsequent appeals, the certifi cate naming Mansour Ahani was found to 
be reasonable by a different Federal Court judge in 1998.38 A “danger opinion” 
was subsequently issued under section 53 of the Immigration Act by the Minister of 
Immigration, allowing Ahani’s deportation from Canada notwithstanding his status 
as a Convention refugee.39 Ahani sought judicial review of the Minister’s decision 
and also challenged the constitutionality of the removal scheme as one which 
permits deportation to a country where there is a risk of torture or other inhumane 
treatment, contrary to Canada’s international law obligations. Although pursued 
through to the Supreme Court of Canada, and despite the opposite decision in the 
companion Suresh decision based on nearly identical facts, this challenge was also 
unsuccessful, clearing the way for Ahani’s removal to Iran.40
 
34 Ahani v Canada, [1995] 3 FCR 669, 100 FTR 261 (FCTD), aff’d (1996), 201 NR 233, 37 CRR (2d) 
181 (FCA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1997] 1 SCR v. 
35 Ibid at 687-88.
36 Ibid at 691.
37 Ibid at 694.
38 Ahani v Canada (1998), 146 FTR 223, 42 Imm LR (2d) 219 (FCTD).
39 Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c 29 (4th Supp), s 53 (1)(a). This section allowed for the removal of a Con-
vention refugee “from Canada to a country where the person’s life or freedom would be threatened 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion” 
if the Minister was, inter alia, “of the opinion that the person constitutes a danger to the security 
of Canada.” The corresponding provision in the current legislation is found in IRPA, supra note 1, 
s 115(2). See John A Dent, “No Right of Appeal: Bill C-11, Criminality, and the Human Rights of 
Permanent Residents Facing Deportation” (2002) 27 Queen’s LJ 749 for a discussion of the evolution 
of this mechanism.
40 Ahani SCC, supra note 31.
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B. Charkaoui
In early 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its long-awaited decision on the 
constitutionality of the security certifi cate provisions of IRPA. The three claimants 
before the Supreme Court, Adil Charkaoui, Hassan Almrei and Mohamed Harkat, 
challenged the procedure under various sections of the Charter and appealed to 
general principles underlying the rule of law. Charkaoui was a permanent resident 
of Canada, while Almrei and Harkat had been found to be Convention refugees but 
had not yet attained residence status. In a unanimous judgment delivered by the 
Chief Justice, the Supreme Court held that the security certifi cate mechanism 
violates section 7 of the Charter by permitting “inadmissibility based on secret 
material without providing for an independent agent at the stage of judicial review 
to better protect the named person’s interests” and that the arbitrary time limits on 
provisions relating to the detention of foreign nationals violate sections 9 and 10(c) 
of the Charter.41
At fi rst glance, the Charkaoui decision appeared to signal a realization of the 
emancipatory potential of the Charter. Contrary to previous instances where refugees, 
permanent residents and other non-citizens had challenged the constitutionality of 
security-related immigration measures on the basis of violations of fundamental 
justice, denial of due process rights or inconsistency with international law norms, 
the Charter claims brought by the three security certifi cate detainees in Charkaoui 
were at least partially vindicated. As discussed above, the section 7 analyses in the 
earlier line of cases were premised on a bare reading of Chiarelli, essentially hinging 
the right to exclude non-citizens on an absolute and monolithic construction of 
state sovereignty, demonstrating “the popular belief that excluding non-citizens is 
the ultimate prerogative of sovereignty.”42  The seeds of this supposition are found 
in Audrey Macklin’s assessment of the relative weight of the Charter rights of non-
citizens faced with removal for reasons of national security. She notes,“[w]hile it is 
technically true that most Charter rights apply to all persons physically in Canada, 
in practice the courts have sharply circumscribed the nature and extent of those 
rights for non-citizens faced with removal,” and “[c]ontrary to the exhortations of 
media pundits and anti-immigrant crusaders, the Constitution has proved a fairly 
thin cloak protecting non-citizens.”43 In other words, such jurisprudence refl ects 
what Parker describes as “an understanding of sovereignty as inhering in the state’s 
control of immigration through the ‘defence’ of a territorial ‘inside’ against the 
incursions of aliens.”44
41 Charkaoui, supra note 2 at para 3.
42 Audrey Macklin, “Borderline Security” in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds, The 
Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 
384 at 389.
43 Ibid at 394 [footnotes omitted].
44 Parker, supra note 6 at 181.
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In Charkaoui, the Supreme Court’s key section 7 reasoning seems to sidestep 
such absolutes, concluding that “[w]hile the deportation of a non-citizen in the 
immigration context may not in itself engage s. 7 of the Charter, some features 
associated with deportation, such as detention in the course of the certifi cate process 
or the prospect of deportation to torture, may do so.”45 Inching away from the 
immigration law as destiny calculus, the Court stated, “[i]n determining whether s. 7 
applies, [a court] must look at the interests at stake rather than the legal label attached 
to the impugned legislation.”46 As in the Ahani and Suresh decisions, however, 
and in light of the limited fi nding of unconstitutionality and the remedy ordered 
(the Court suspended its declaration for one year from the date of judgment47), 
the limited re-working of the Chiarelli framework in Charkaoui ought to be seen as 
only a partial incursion into sovereign power. While the Court retreated somewhat 
from non-citizenship as a presumptive limit on the scope of rights, it also implicitly 
maintained previous historical and conceptual currents in the jurisprudence in 
its approach to non-citizenship and exclusion (the juridical migration-security-
territory nexus) on which Charter cases in this area are predicated. In the cases 
that have followed, this limited incursion has been further inscribed through the 
selective extra-territorial deployment of Charter protections.
III. POST-CHARKAOUI
Four judgments rendered since the decision in Charkaoui shed further light on 
this argument. The Supreme Court considered the issue of the extraterritorial 
application of the Charter in a criminal law (search and seizure) context in R v Hape, 
ruling on the claim made by a Canadian citizen whose off-shore offi ce was the subject 
of a warrantless search by RCMP offi cers working with local police. A fi ve-judge 
majority of the Court ruled that although the Charter generally has no application 
extra-territorially, its application should be considered in light of Canada’s inter-
national law commitments, such that Canadian state agents should not participate 
in actions that would cause Canada to be in violation of international law principles 
of jurisdiction. The Court called this a jurisprudential concept “distinct from, but 
integral to, the principle of state sovereignty” and arising from “sovereign equality 
[between states] and the corollary duty of non-intervention.”48 The Court outlined 
a two step approach to determining whether Charter guarantees apply to a foreign 
investigation: fi rst, determine whether the activity falls under section 32(1) (in 
other words, whether the conduct of a Canadian state actor is implicated) and if yes, 
and depending on the facts of the case, determine whether there is “an exception 
to the principle of sovereignty that would justify the application of the Charter to 
45 Charkaoui, supra note 2 at para 17 [emphasis in the original].
46 Ibid at para 18 [emphasis added].
47 Ibid at para 140.
48 Hape, supra note 5 at para 57.
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the extraterritorial activities of the state actor.”49 On the facts in Hape, the Court 
found that although the RCMP offi cers involved were clearly government actors, 
the searches and seizures took place in the Turks and Caicos under local authority, 
with consent given only for the participation of Canadian offi cers but not for the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.50 As a result, the searches were not “matters 
within the authority of Parliament” and the Charter did not apply.51 The latest in a 
line of cases considering the question of extraterritorial application of the Charter to 
evidence gathering abroad,52 the majority ruling in Hape is principally a restatement 
of classic jurisprudential engagement with state sovereignty as evidenced in the 
interplay between domestic law and the international realm. Yet a three-judge 
minority decision would have grounded extra-territorial application of the Charter 
in the involvement of the RCMP, belying the majority’s infl exible approach to 
sovereign authority and consent as a controlling determinant of jurisdiction.53 Read 
as a whole, Hape is a reminder that the application of doctrinal rules with respect 
to the extra-territorial application of the Charter is a contested exercise, even in a 
context where there is little to no engagement with the themes of national security, 
terrorism and war to which the same doctrinal analysis is applied.
A year later, in 2008, the Supreme Court ruled for the fi rst time on the 
case of Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen captured in Afghanistan by United States (US) 
military forces in 2002 at the age of 15 and then imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. Khadr was questioned by Canadian state agents in Guantanamo in 2003, 
despite their knowledge of the fact that he had been subjected to sleep deprivation 
(a form of torture designed to render him less resistant to interrogation), and 
information obtained during those interviews was shared with the US authorities. 
In a unanimous, unsigned ruling, the Supreme Court determined that section 7 of 
the Charter applied to require the disclosure of this evidence to Khadr, on the basis 
of a US Supreme Court decision fi nding that the procedures in place during the 
interviews violated US law as well as international human rights treaties to which 
Canada is party.54 Highlighting the exception set out in Hape, the Court noted that 
the deference required by the principle of comity “ends where clear violations of 
international law and fundamental human rights begin.”55 Given the unambiguous 
ruling of the US Supreme Court and the factual circumstances underlying Khadr’s 
interactions with Canadian investigators, “no question of deference to foreign law 
arises. The Charter bound Canada to the extent that the conduct of Canadian offi -
cials involved it in a process that violated Canada’s international obligations.”56
49 Ibid at para 113.
50 Ibid at paras 115-17.
51 Ibid at para 118.
52 See ibid at para 71-82 for an overview of the reasons in these cases.
53 Ibid at paras 161-62.
54 Khadr 2008, supra note 5 at paras 3, 26.
55 Ibid at para 18, citing Hape, supra note 5 at para 52.
56 Khadr 2008, supra note 5 at para 26.
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In late 2008, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld a ruling in an application 
for judicial review brought by Amnesty International and the British Columbia Civil 
Liberties Association, holding that the Charter does not apply during the detention of 
non-Canadian prisoners and prisoners of war by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan 
or their transfer to Afghan authorities.57 The ruling distinguished Khadr on the facts 
of the two cases and found that no exception to comity and extraterritoriality 
applied, but rather that international humanitarian law governed the situation. 
Addressing the applicants’ argument that Hape set out just such an exception, Justice 
Desjardins, writing for the Court, stated that while the Supreme Court had found 
that “deference and comity end where clear violations of international law and 
fundamental human rights begin,” this does not necessarily mean “the Charter then 
applies as a consequence of these violations.”58 This reasoning is based on Justice 
Desjardins’ fi nding that the Canadian Forces “are not an occupying force—they are 
in Afghanistan at the request and with the consent of the governing authority.”59
Finally, in early 2010, the Supreme Court issued a second unanimous 
decision in the Omar Khadr case, ruling that although the Canadian state had 
“breached Mr. Khadr’s s. 7 rights in 2003 and 2004 through its participation in 
the then-illegal military regime at Guantanamo Bay”60 (in other words, the matters 
under consideration in the 2008 Khadr ruling), the remedy sought—an order 
that Canada request Khadr’s repatriation—was not appropriate. Although “courts 
are empowered to make orders ensuring that the government’s foreign affairs 
prerogative is exercised in accordance with the constitution,”61 the Court concluded 
that “the evidentiary uncertainties, the limitations of the Court’s institutional 
com pe tence, and the need to respect the prerogative powers of the executive, 
lead us to conclude that the proper remedy is declaratory relief.”62 The Court’s 
accommodation of executive prerogative stood in sharp contrast to the argument 
by one of the Interveners, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, that “Canadian 
state offi cials’ ongoing decision not to request the respondent’s repatriation” trig-
gered the application of the Charter in and of itself and that the appropriate remedy 
for a resulting s. 7 breach would be to order such a request.63
IV. SOVEREIGNTY: THREE MEDITATIONS 
Having traced the trajectory of case law under the Charter relating to non-citizenship, 
security and jurisdiction, the remainder of this article proposes three theorizations 
57 Amnesty International Canada, supra note 5. 
58 Ibid at para 20.
59 Ibid at para 26.
60 Khadr 2010, supra note 5 at para 29, referring to the holding in Khadr 2008, supra note 5. 
61 Khadr 2010, supra note 5 at para 37.
62 Ibid at para 46.
63 Khadr 2010, supra note 5 (Factum of the Intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association at paras 3 
and 21) [footnotes omitted].
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of the means by which constitutional rights refl ect, construct and maintain state 
sovereignty. Employing an interdisciplinary method aimed at excavating the histo-
rical, political and analytical underpinnings of constitutional law, these theoretical 
excursions consider sovereignty in terms of territory, governance and collective 
identity as refl ected in Charter decision-making. Each of these analyses is concerned 
with the impact of shifting notions and practices of sovereignty and evolving 
techniques of power and statecraft on the emancipatory potential of rights. The 
fi rst analytic is about the simultaneous construction and reifi cation of sovereignty 
through and by Charter jurisprudence, as rights act to establish and re-establish 
the sovereignty of the Canadian state, viewed historically and contemporaneously 
through the lens of nation-building. The second theorization interrogates the rela-
tionship between international law and the Charter, and how their intertwined ope-
ration serves to minimize the already limited sovereign incursions of international 
norms. The third, and most nascent, argument is about biopolitics and how Charter 
jurisprudence is implicated in non-juridical modes of governmentality, as it acts 
selectively on some bodies/subjects within and beyond the territory of the nation-
state. These three analyses are necessarily overlapping, but each attempts to carve 
out a distinct aspect of the interplay between constitutional rights, sovereignty and 
territory, casting seemingly static legal doctrine and reasoning in a new light.
A. The State of Rights: Acts of Sovereignty and the Charter
In contrast to the taken-for-granted, yet seemingly fi xed, understandings of sove-
reignty in the case law set out above, Charter decisions with respect to security, 
territory and migration should also be understand as juridical “acts of sovereignty” 
in their own right. This claim arises from Peter Nyers’ suggestion that “[w]hile state 
sovereignty has been typically understood as either a legal principal or an achieved 
state of being, ‘it’ must also be understood as a practice: historical, performative, 
constantly in motion.”64 Seen in this light, the course of Charter jurisprudence is a 
way of making and unmaking sovereignty, a constant re-drawing of borders beyond 
and against territory through the selective application, receipt and recognition of 
rights guarantees.65 Bringing to light this process does not just provide an alternative 
explanation of the evolution of doctrinal rules, but reframes that evolution as a means 
of theorizing the reinscription, (re)construction and reifi cation of state sovereignty 
through law. As described in the remainder of this section, the trajectory of Charter 
decisions as “acts of sovereignty”—conceptually and doctrinally—is most visible 
in relation to juridical elements of nation-building: citizenship and immigration, 
national security and the borders of the nation-state.
64 Peter Nyers, “The accidental citizen: acts of sovereignty and (un) making citizenship” (2006) 35:1 
Economy and Society 22 at 26 [in-text citation omitted].
65 For a cogent discussion of sovereignty, extraterritoriality and constitutional rights in the US context, 
see James Thuo Gathii, “Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism and International Law” (2003) 67 
Albany Law Review 335.
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I rely here on sociologist Saskia Sassen’s analysis of the shifting salience of 
the modern state in terms of sovereignty and exclusive territory in the context 
of transnational economic frameworks, globalization and technological shifts. 
She argues that “[i]t is in this sense that immigration is a strategic site to inquire 
about the limits of the new order: it feeds the renationalizing of politics and the 
notion of the importance of sovereign control over borders, yet it is embedded 
in a larger dynamic of transnationalization of economic spaces and human rights 
regimes.”66 In highlighting the complex way in which the state’s exclusive authority 
over territory and borders has changed, Sassen’s interdisciplinary approach to the 
political economy of globalization illuminates the broader import of the relationship 
between the Charter and immigration law and policy. Constitutional law becomes 
visible as one example of the way in which domestic courts negotiate contested 
legal spaces, even as they themselves construct the juridical framework of national 
sovereignty. The nationalizing role of constitutional rights is clearly visible in the 
pre-Charkaoui security certifi cate case law, particularly in the reinscription of state 
sovereignty through the persistent linkages drawn between national security and 
non-citizenship—the current iteration of the historical narrative of immigration 
law as nation-building. This modern expression of a state’s exclusionary prerogative 
has its roots in what F. Pearl Eliadis describes as “ancient customs, traditional 
perceptions of national self-interest and political manipulation of local resentment 
of ‘foreigners,’ all of which have created fundamental legal distinctions between 
nationals and non-nationals that go back hundreds of years.”67
More specifi cally, however, the roots of the Chiarelli sovereignty calculus 
lie in pre-Charter decisions that laid the foundation for the status of the “alien” in 
the common law of Canada. As discussed above, Chiarelli itself followed from the 
decision of the Federal Court in Brito, in which non-removal from Canada was 
posited as a discretionary privilege rather than a right deserving of legal protection. 
That reasoning was based on the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Prata and the 
English case R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, where Lord Denning MR summarized 
the position of an alien at common law as follows:
At common law no alien has any right to enter this country except by 
leave of the Crown; and the Crown can refuse leave without giving 
any reason: [citation omitted]. If he comes by leave, the Crown can 
impose such conditions as it thinks fi t, as to his length of stay, or 
otherwise. He has no right whatever to remain here. He is liable to 
be sent home to his own country at any time if, in the opinion of the 
66 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996) at xvi [Sassen, Losing Control].
67 F Pearl Eliadis, “The Swing from Singh: The Narrowing Application of the Charter in Immigration 
Law” (1995) 26 Immigration Law Reporter (2d) 130 at 136.
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Crown, his presence here is not conducive to the public good; and 
for this purpose, the executive may arrest him and put him on board 
a ship or aircraft bound for his own country [citation omitted].68 
In turn, the lineage of these cases traces back to a 1906 Privy Council 
case, Attorney General for Canada v Cain, in which the constitutionality of the 1897 
Alien Labour Act69 was upheld on the basis that “[o]ne of the rights possessed by the 
supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter 
that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to 
expel or deport from that State, at pleasure ….”70 Although Cain was decided under 
the Alien Labour Act rather than the Immigration Act, and thus dealt with a purely 
exclusionary statute of limited application, the Privy Council’s construction of 
an infl exible and seemingly immutable role for the state in relation to “aliens” has 
endured and expanded beyond the confi nes of one defunct statute. The result is, 
as Edward Morgan argues, that “[t]he historical pattern of Canadian immigration 
law … may be said to be one of movement in terms of process and stagnation in 
terms of substance…. Thus, alienage simultaneously decreases in signifi cance and 
maintains its time honoured importance.”71 In Suresh and Ahani, the demarcation of 
borders from the inside through the exclusion/excision of threat and risk is espe-
cially clear in the balancing test with respect to deportation to face torture. In this 
calculus, constitutional rights serve to underscore the act of sovereignty inherent 
in routine administrative determinations with respect to removal and detention. 
These are key decisions that highlight “the essence of the state’s sovereignty, which 
must be juristically defi ned correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but 
as the monopoly to decide,”72 a role that the advent of the Charter has impacted but 
not eliminated.  
If Charkaoui suggested an emancipatory turn, given that the judgment did 
implicate the most egregious of state actions in respect to the intersection of national 
security and immigration law, it only minimally shifted the overall conceptual and 
analytical framework for the Charter as it relates to, constructs and maintains state 
sovereignty. Again positioning rights as a minimal intrusion on the state’s ability 
to exclude from within, Charkaoui is not a disruption of the juridical migration-
security-territory sovereignty nexus, but a mere recalibration. Indeed, with the 
subsequent case law we see the law redrawing boundaries even in cases where 
immigration law is not at issue. This is perhaps clearest in the Khadr decisions, in 
which the remedy of repatriation—of a Canadian citizen—was ultimately denied, 
68 [1973] 2 All ER 741 at 747 (CA) [footnotes omitted].
69 1897 (UK) 60 & 61 Vict, c 11.
70 [1904-07] All ER Rep 582 at 584 [Cain].
71 Edward M Morgan, “Aliens and Process Rights: The Open and Shut Case of Legal Sovereignty” (1988-
89) 7 Wis Int’l LJ 107 at 125.
72 Schmitt, supra note 10 at 13 [emphasis added].
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thereby extending the Charter’s long-standing approach to executive prerogative 
and the contingent rights of non-citizens. By limiting oversight of the operation of 
executive power justifi ed on the basis of what amounts to “the interests of state” to 
declaratory relief, the Khadr cases juridically enshrine foreign relations, diplomacy 
and statecraft as “acts of sovereignty.” Despite the Supreme Court’s declaration that 
his section 7 rights had been violated, Omar Khadr remains cast out from both 
Canadian national territory and law, his very location the result of overlapping, yet 
rigid and irreconcilable, national sovereignties and modes of power—excluded 
from without through the same calculus that excludes from within. We witness, in 
other words, an apparent expansion of the reach of Charter rights, but only in ways 
consistent with sovereignty, never as an incursion. 
A similar phenomenon is also visible in the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the exception required to ground extra-territorial jurisdiction in Hape and 
previous cases. The choice to fi nd an exception is a quintessential act of sovereignty 
domestically, but the Charter extends this particular act of sovereignty beyond the 
borders of the Canadian state through diplomacy, as in the matter of Omar Khadr, 
but also military force (Amnesty International).73 In facilitating acts of state through 
law, constitutional rights jurisprudence contributes to “a … host of complex 
practices and wilful performances” necessary for the constant reproduction of state 
sovereignty.74 As a result, Charter jurisprudence commits acts of sovereignty at the 
same time as it regulates or even catalyzes direct acts of sovereignty by the state.
However, Charkaoui and the cases that follow do more than underscore the 
shifting nature of sovereignty in the aftermath of 9/11 and the dictates of globa-
lization more broadly.75 Beyond its historical grounding in immigration law, the 
roots of modern Charter jurisprudence also lie in the foundational narrative of the 
Canadian nation-state, refl ecting a discursive and analytical legacy emanating from 
Canada’s colonial history, particularly the interaction of Indigenous and European 
norms. The violence inherent in that founding act of sovereignty reveals what Nyers 
calls the “profound and inescapable paradox” of such a moment: “the founding of 
any sovereign order involves practices that are both violent and arbitrary.”76 It is 
not only the foundational moment that refl ects this violence, however, as acts of 
sovereignty are continuously mediated through indigenous law, at once highlighting 
and obfuscating the violence and paradox of the founding moment. The Supreme 
Court recently considered the meaning and content of Canadian sovereignty, both 
historically and currently, in the context of a symbolic border crossing by Grand 
73 The Speaker’s ruling in the subsequent House of Commons debate with respect to the disclosure of 
documents pertaining to the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan underscores the complex and frag-
mentary nature of territorially delineated sovereignty. See e.g. Adrian Wyld, “Afghan Records Denial 
is Privilege Breach: Speaker”, CBC News (27 April 2010), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>.
74 Nyers, supra note 64 at 26.
75 See generally Sassen, Losing Control, supra note 66.
76 Nyers, supra note 64 at 26.
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Chief Michael Mitchell over a Canada-US boundary located in traditional Mohawk 
Nation territory.77 He carried a large amount of goods, for both free distribution 
and sale, but refused to pay customs duties, waiting until he was served with a 
notice for unpaid duty to fi le a constitutional challenge to the imposition of such 
fees. Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied Mitchell’s claim, arguing that he had 
not established a constitutional right pursuant to section 35(1) of the Charter. In 
a concurring judgment, however, Justice Binnie explored the sovereignty-related 
issues raised by the case, particularly the traditional doctrine of “sovereign incompa-
tibility” – the notion that the sovereignty of First Nations was incompatible with 
the new European, and later Canadian, sovereignty.78 He concluded that, although 
this pre-Charter view was once a justifi cation for an almost complete obliteration of 
Aboriginal interest in traditional lands, sovereign incompatibility ought now to be 
seen as “a doctrine that must be applied with caution.”79 Nonetheless, Justice Binnie 
held that “[c]ontrol over the mobility of persons and goods into one country is, 
and always has been, a fundamental attribute of sovereignty,”80 and that therefore, 
“the international trading/mobility right claimed by the respondent as a citizen 
of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy is incompatible with the historical 
attributes of Canadian sovereignty.”81
Having regard to the degree of autonomy within Canadian sovereignty 
available for some other Aboriginal practices, traditions and customs, however, 
Justice Binnie’s analysis demonstrates that such a conclusion was not immediately 
obvious. Read at its broadest, the decision recognized that the fl ip side of sovereign 
incompatibility may be sovereign compatibility, with the suggested “cautionary” appli-
cation of the former doctrine arising from both the paradox of sovereignty’s founding 
moment and the Charter as a site of mediation between current sovereignties. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, such elasticity was not recognized by the Supreme Court 
in Mitchell, nor in subsequent cases, particularly those in which Aboriginal persons 
charged with criminal offences have denied the jurisdiction of Canadian courts. 
These challenges were dismissed due to the “certain reality of Canadian sovereignty” 
established by legal principle and precedent.82 Nonetheless, this line of cases refl ects 
another historical antecedent of Charter decisions confronting current modes 
of state sovereignty, while at the same time demonstrating a more self-refl exive 
judicial act of sovereignty. As Stewart Motha argues in the context of Australian 
debates with respect to Indigenous land rights, sovereignty must not be understood 
as unitary or as “One,” suggesting that present-day legal struggles over Indigenous 
77 Mitchell, supra note 9.
78 Ibid at para 150.
79 Ibid at para 151.
80 Ibid at para 160.
81 Ibid at para 163.
82 R v David (2000), 45 WCB (2d) 471 at para 15, 2000 CLB 1177 (Ont Sup Ct), cited in R v Francis 
(2007), 85 OR (3d) 45 at para 7, [2007] 3 CNLR 294 (Ont Sup Ct).
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claims to sovereignty highlight sovereignty’s “supposition and alterability by law” as 
much as they do its resilience.83
B. International Law, State Sovereignty and the Domestic Realm of the Charter
The current prevailing narrative of international law as a check on sovereignty is a 
triumphalist account of the demise of the Westphalian order and the concomitant 
rise of a universally empowering, if not liberating, language of human rights, in 
which nation-states are no longer the only agents or subjects of international law. 
This narrative is aptly summed up by Geoffrey Robertson’s contention that the 
international human rights movement has been a “struggle against sovereignty.”84 
In the Canadian context, debates regarding the actual veracity of this account are 
epitomized by evaluations of the intersecting roles of international human rights 
norms and constitutional guarantees in determinations of Convention refugee status. 
Noting that “national policies with regard to the admission and exclusion of non-
citizens are typically characterized as central aspects of state sovereignty,” Sharryn 
Aiken maintains that attempts to overcome this prerogative in international law, 
particularly in the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees85 
and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,86 were crucial developments 
that signalled a shift in the character of traditional state sovereignty.87 Catherine 
Dauvergne, however, argues that “[t]he extent to which refugee law can be under-
stood as a constraint on national sovereignty is exaggerated by the fact that there 
are no other international legal constraints in the migration law realm,” and that in 
practice, “the Refugee Convention is a minimal constraint.”88 Reg Whitaker’s view, 
on the other hand, is more mixed: “far from representing a limitation upon state 
sovereignty, granting inclusion is actually a quintessential exercise of sovereignty 
[citation omitted],”89 as can be seen through policies linking immigration levels to 
labour market needs, admission requirements based on skills, education or language 
ability and the ethnic heritage-based membership rules of certain states (e.g., 
Germany or Israel). Refugee admissions pursuant to the governing international 
Convention, however, are not dependent on these or similar rules, and thus exist 
outside of the sovereignty-as-exclusion model. Current redefi nitions of refugees as 
83 Stewart Motha, “The Sovereign Event in a Nation’s Law” (2002) 13 Law and Critique 311 at 311.
84 Geoffrey Robertson QC, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, 3d ed (London, UK: 
Penguin Books, 2006) at xxx.
85 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 189 UNTS 150, Can TS 1969 No 6 
(entered into force 22 April 1954, accession by Canada 4 June 1969).
86 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc 
A/810, (1948) 71. 
87 Sharryn J Aiken, “Of Gods and Monsters: National Security and Canadian Refugee Policy” (2001) 
14:1 Revue québécoise de droit international 7 at 8.
88 Catherine Dauvergne, “Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times” (2004) 67:4 
Mod L Rev 588 at 596.
89 Reg Whitaker, “Refugees: The Security Dimension” (1998) 2:3 Citizenship Studies 413 at 416.
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fi rst and foremost security risks or threats are, according to Whitaker, “inspired by 
the desire to reaffi rm traditional national sovereignty,” but are actually “an important 
part of a discourse that in practice facilitates the erosion of traditional sovereignty.”90 
This is true in the sense that refugee policies are guided as much by transnational 
political commitments as by internal legal practices, as was demonstrated by the 
coordinated responses of Western countries to the fl ow of refugees from Eastern 
Europe during the Cold War. These tensions are attenuated in pre-Charkaoui security 
certifi cate case law, where international law norms governing asylum nonetheless left 
Convention refugees subject to removal or exclusion, notwithstanding the Charter.
This underscores the implicit exercise of sovereignty underlying both the refugee 
determination process and the balancing of constitutional rights against imperatives 
of national security and migration generally, and their intersection specifi cally. 
Charkaoui and the cases that followed have maintained this relationship 
between Canada’s domestic law and policy and governing international norms, 
keeping in place a limited incursion on sovereignty marked by current iterations of 
the historical political considerations described by Whitaker. Tracing the shift from 
fi xed, discrete security concerns of the Cold War era to the nearly boundless terrain
of the “War on Terror” makes the resilience of the relationship especially evident. 
More than a jurisprudential battle between domestic and international law, the inter-
play of international and constitutional rights guarantees reveals another aspect of 
the construction and maintenance of that domestic legal context, suggesting in turn 
a lens through which to glimpse the inherently political nature of that project. Just 
as the Charter refl ects courts engaged in “acts of sovereignty,” judicial engagement 
with international law demonstrates a parallel process of nation-building, one inex-
tricably linked to processes of globalization and the resulting shift in state sovereignty, 
suggesting that the “retreat of the state”91 argument is something of a red herring. 
As Sassen argues, the tension between state sovereignty and international human 
rights is not a clear inside-outside binary given that the international human rights 
regime must operate partly inside the national state.92 She goes on to show, “as is 
the case with the new legal frameworks for global capital, it is this partial grounding 
of a transnational regime in national institutions and practices (at least in countries 
under the rule of law) that lends it a distinctive power and legitimacy.”93
In this sense, the role of international norms in shaping domestic constitu-
tional rights claims and, by extension, state sovereignty, is only completely legible 
as a process when viewed in the context of an unequal world order both created 
and facilitated by international law.94 It is no coincidence that the vast majority of 
90 Ibid at 414.
91 See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the  World Economy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also Sassen, supra note 66.
92 Ibid at 65.
93 Ibid at 61.
94 See e.g. Amy Bartholomew, ed, Empire’s Law: The American Imperial Project and the ‘War to Remake the 
World’ (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2006).
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security certifi cate cases have as their background context refugee claims arising 
from political struggles with global geopolitical signifi cance (e.g., Sri Lanka (Suresh), 
Iran (Ahani), Algeria (Charkaoui), Israel/Palestine (Al  Yamani)) and that three of the 
four cases that followed are focused on issues and events related to the occupation of 
Afghanistan and the “War on Terror.”  The crucial historical work of Antony Anghie 
and other scholars associated with the Third World Approaches to International 
Law movement has arguably revealed the colonial origins of international law, 
highlighting the ways in which sovereignty arose from relations of conquest and 
inequality: “the structure of sovereignty, the identity of sovereignty, no less than 
the identity of an individual or a people, is formed by its history, its origins in and 
engagement with the colonial encounter.”95 Such historicizing calls into question 
the presumption of sovereign inequality in the international sphere96 and suggests 
that the interplay between the Charter and international law norms continues to 
operate through a hegemonic frame. For example, Khadr and Amnesty International 
both trace the operation of the Charter in spheres bounded by Canada’s relationship 
with the US,97 while Charkaoui and its predecessors refl ect the faultlines of Canada’s 
international commitments, allegiances and responsibilities more broadly. Finally, the 
schism between civilizer and uncivilized refl ected in international law’s history—
from its inception during the conquest of the Americas through to the Mandate 
System98 and beyond—is discernible within the demarcations of race and ethnicity 
underlying citizenship generally and security certifi cates particularly.99 Sherene 
Razack identifi es this as “race thinking,” arguing that the clash between the Charter 
and national security “is underpinned by the idea that modern, enlightened, secular 
peoples must protect themselves from pre-modern religious peoples whose loyalty 
to tribe and community reigns over their commitment to the role of law.”100
Accordingly, constitutional rights consistently serve as a site of connection 
between the domestic and global. Commenting on the Suresh decision, Obiora Okafor 
and Pius Okoronkwo argue that the Supreme Court “viewed the Canadian legal order 
95 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005) at 312.
96 See e.g. Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
97 See also the discussion with respect to Canada-US diplomatic relations in the context of the ‘war on 
terror’ in the Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, especially Recommendation 22 calling on 
the Canadian government to register a formal objection with the US government concerning their 
treatment of Mr. Arar: Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Offi cials in Rela-
tion to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: 
Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2006) at 361.
98 See generally Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and 
Third  World Resistance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
99 With the exception of Ernst Zündel, a white German citizen, all of the men named in recent security 
certifi cates have been Muslims, most of them from Arab countries, as have many of the targets of 
earlier certifi cates. See Zündel v Canada, 2006 FCA 356, 358 NR 161.
100 Sherene H Razack , “‘Your Client has a Profi le:’ Race and National Security in Canada After 9/11” in 
Austin Sarat, ed, Studies in Law, Politics and Society (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group, 2007) vol 40, 3 at 8.
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as virtually shielded by the concept of state sovereignty from the direct governance 
of international norms.”101 Absent from this calculus, they suggest, is an alternative 
weaker conception of state sovereignty of the sort that Western governments 
“have promoted for decades as the panacea for most of the human 
rights and economic problems of the weaker Third World states, 
one that allows much more room for the penetration of foreign and 
international legal, economic, political, and social norms and power 
into the domestic orders of states.”102
However, as outlined above, it is not just in the deportation to torture 
context that the interplay of Charter rights and international law serves to sustain 
the sovereign power of the Canadian state, even where state agents such as the 
police and military operate extra-territorially. The limited role of international law 
norms as an exception in Hape and subsequent cases signals the use of constitutional 
law as a shield against the limited incursion on state sovereignty by international 
law norms. In limiting both the reach of the Charter (in terms of subject/object and 
territory) and the remedies it can offer (for example, not just refusing repatriation 
for its own sake, but failing to prevent the torture that gave rise to the remedy of 
disclosure, as in the Khadr matter), recent Canadian constitutional law maintains 
the selective constraint international law has always placed on relatively powerful 
and wealthy states.
C. Biopolitics and the Rights of the Abandoned
In a study of Australian policy on the detention of asylum seekers, Anne Orford 
argues that “human rights law in its liberal manifestation offers limited means for 
countering the administration of human life represented by biopolitics, and indeed 
in some ways supports this mode of governmentality.”103 Orford invokes the 
Foucaldian notion of “biopower,” a technique of power and control predicated on 
the management of populations through the regulation of life and the human body: 
birth, death, health and reproduction.104 Michel Foucault himself described biopower 
as “what brought life and its mechanism into the realm of explicit calculations and 
101 Obiora Chinedu Okafor & Pius Lekwuwa Okoronkwo, “Re-confi guring Non-refoulement? The Suresh 
Decision, ‘Security Relativism’, and the International Human Rights Imperative” (2003) 15:1 Int’l J 
Refugee L 30 at 53-54.
102 Ibid at 54.
103 Anne Orford, “Biopolitics and the Tragic Subject of Human Rights” in Elizabeth Dauphinee & Cristina 
Masters, eds, The Logics of Biopower and the  War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007) 205 at 206.
104 See generally Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended:” Lectures at the Collège de France, ed by Mauro 
Bertani et al, translated by David Macey (New York: Picador, 1997); Michel Foucault, The Birth of 
Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, ed by Michel Senellart et al, translated by Graham Burchell 
(New York: Picador, 2004).
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made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.”105 In tracing the 
genesis of “power over life,” Foucault highlighted the historical evolution of sove-
reign rule towards complex techniques of management and regulation of life rather 
than the threat or control of death.106 Accordingly, Orford suggests, sovereign power 
became preoccupied with control rather than domination, meaning that rights 
guarantees took on a facilitative role, ameliorating the excesses incurred in the 
management of human life, particularly in cases where core sovereign functions are 
also at play: migration control, national security and the administration of (quasi-)
criminal justice. Yet human rights, in focusing only on the juridical or sovereign 
form, obfuscate “the operation of power in its biopolitical form,” backgrounding 
administrative, diplomatic and managerial channels of control, all of which are 
deeply implicated in the facts of the cases outlined above.107 Rights represent the 
legitimacy of the sovereign state, states Giorgio Agamben, never more crucially 
than at the “hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and bio -
political models of power” marked by the convergence of “techniques of indivi-
dualization and totalizing procedures.”108 For Agamben, this moment crystallizes in 
the state of emergency or exception, when law facilitates the legitimation of sovereign 
power.109 But as Margaret Kohn explains, since sovereign power is fundamentally the 
power to place people into the category of bare life—a life lived outside the politi-
cally or morally constituted community, while being at the same time constitutive 
of the political order—“the law, in effect, both produces and legitimizes marginality 
and exclusion.”110 
This invocation of biopolitics makes legible the process by which Charter 
rights serve to selectively exert power over persons located both within and beyond 
the territory of the nation-state, producing a shifting terrain of sovereign power that 
underscores how the “sovereignty of the nation-state is grounded on the inclusion 
of the bodies of its subjects through the management and transformation of human 
life.”111 Seen in this light, constitutional law, while posited as the protector of life, 
actually facilitates the selective abandonment of life. As refl ected in both pre- and 
post-Charkaoui decision-making, rights claimants abandoned by the law of the 
sovereign state are “included as subjects of law only by being excluded from the 
community to which the law gives rise.”112 Orford argues that this “hidden point of 
intersection” demonstrates that the only way that 
105 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978) 
vol 1 at 143.
106 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, ed by Michel Senellart et 
al, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2007).
107 Orford, supra note 103 at 215.
108 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) at 6.
109 Ibid at 15.
110 Margaret Kohn, “Bare Life and the Limits of the Law”, Book Review of State of Exception by Giorgio 
Agamben, (2006) 9:2 Theory & Event at para 10.
111 Orford, supra note 103 at 209. See also Agamben, supra note 101 at 126-35.
112 Orford, supra note 103 at 205-06.
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“the state can appear at the same time as the mighty sovereign and 
as the manager, protector, and cultivator of life is if the population is 
fragmented, so that some people within its jurisdiction or territory 
are understood to be properly subject to the power to kill (or detain 
or torture), and some are subject to its powers of normalization, 
regularization, and cultivation of life.”113
Throughout the security certifi cate jurisprudence, this division takes place 
almost invisibly, hidden in plain sight, the minimal rights protections imposed by the 
Court in Charkaoui only serving to maintain the selective convergence of juridical 
and biopolitical power. In Ahani, the abandonment is even more pronounced, as 
a Convention refugee present in Canadian territory is nonetheless subsequently 
excluded through administrative procedures, notwithstanding the Charter rights 
also accorded to him. In clearing the way for a sovereign decision to deport Ahani to 
Iran, the Supreme Court facilitated a mode of governance only fully comprehensible 
as biopolitical. Post Charkaoui, the administration of life through the operation of 
rights remains entangled within this frame, catalyzing the further legitimation of 
sovereign power within and beyond national territory. In the Khadr judgments, 
the abandonment of rights-claimants takes physical form–a biopolitical exercise of 
sovereignty over a Canadian citizen beyond Canadian territory, where Guantanamo 
Bay stands as the quintessential site of bare life. Finally, the Amnesty International 
decision illuminates how the exercise of military command elides the simultaneous 
operation of biopower, as clashing sovereignties arising from occupation enmesh 
detainees in less, rather than more, law. 
The evolution of sovereign power toward biopolitical governance has 
thus seemingly increased the possible terrain—territorial and juridical—of 
constitutional rights claims, while at the same time limiting their realization as 
effective emancipatory tools. Reach, in other words, does not equal remedy. Viewed 
in this light, this shift is another illustration of the complex relationship between 
national sovereignty and human rights generally, further eroding the notion that 
the latter are a serious threat to the former. As Balakrishnan Rajagopal has argued 
in the context of the rise of international human rights as political instruments, the 
myth that “human rights is an anti-state discourse” relies on an understanding of 
sovereignty that does not account for non-juridical forms of power.114 Highlighting 
biopolitical forms of power, governance and administration uncovers the interplay 
of constitutional rights and sovereignty not as purely oppositional forces, but as 
constitutive elements of the modern state.
113 Ibid at 222-23.
114 Rajagopal, supra note 98 at 189.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In the midst of such enigmatic sovereignty, Anne Orford’s contention that “the 
invocation of human rights constrains our capacity to think about and counter 
the ways in which power circulates in this global politics and economy”115 must 
serve as more a provocation than a nihilist act of abandonment. Indeed, the three 
meditations in respect of sovereignty, the state and the boundaries of the Charter 
set out above ought to be read in that emancipatory spirit, having been shaped 
and inspired by campaigns against security certifi cates116 and in support of Omar 
Khadr,117 as well as by other movements for social justice aiming to realize the 
potential of human and constitutional rights guarantees. Nonetheless, inside the 
courtrooms where security certifi cates are challenged and other rights claimed, 
the operation of the Charter continues to redraw lines of exclusion and inclusion 
within ever shifting borders of territory, power and authority. Understanding the 
Charter as “sovereign” locates Charkaoui historically, analytically and politically, 
revealing the extra-doctrinal framework informing the limitations of the judgment. 
Just as importantly, the three modes of a sovereign Charter theorized above—
acts of sovereignty, international law and biopolitics—together demonstrate the 
complex and often contradictory impact of globalization, internationalization and 
supra-national governance on constitutional rights. Given this global context, the 
historical antecedents that continue to constrain Charter decision-making and the 
political imperative of constitutional rights claims, sovereignty must be recognized 
as a site of engagement and contestation. For Agamben, this project would “clear 
the way for a long-overdue renewal of categories in the service of a politics in which 
bare life is no longer separated and excepted, either in the state order or in the 
fi gure of human rights.”118 This article has aimed to make a modest contribution to 
such renewal, sketching out the terrains of rights, territory and security as political 
categories available for disruption, redefi nition and emancipation.
115 Orford, supra note 103 at 206.
116 See e.g. Homes Not Bombs, Campaign to Stop Secret Trials in Canada, online: Homes Not Bombs 
<http://www.homesnotbombs.ca>.
117 See e.g. University of Toronto Faculty of Law, Khadr Case Resources Page, online: University of Toronto 
< http://library.law.utoronto.ca>.
118 Agamben, supra note 108 at 134.
